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INTRADAYYEN/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS: NEWS ORNOISE?
ABSTRACT
Intradaymovements in the yen/dollar rate are examined over the 1980-86
period using opening and closing quotes in the New York and Tokyo markets.
The results indicate that random-walk behavior is violated about half of the
time in various subsamples. However, the economic significance of departures
from the random-walk model diminshes over time. Large jumps in the exchange
rate also are examined, and some evidence on subsequent mean reversion is
presented. Finally, the response of Japanese and U.S. stock prices suggests
that intraday yen/dollar rate movements do contain at least some relevant
information.
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Institute of Economic Research Department of Finance DJ-1O
Hitotsubashi University University of Washington
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I. INTRODUCTION
The behaviorofasset returns in terms of both their predictability and their relation to economic
fundamentals has received considerable attention. For exchange rates, a common efficient markets -
rationalexpectations view is that most rate movements are unpredictable, and these unpredictable
movements result from news about economic fundamentals (e.g., Mussa 1979, Dornbusch 1980, and
Frenkel 1981). Different aspects of this view, however, have been questioned either empirically or
theoretically. -
First,while some portion of- longer-run movements in exchange rates may potentially be
predictable using forward premiums or interest-rate differentials, for example, very short-run
movements should approximately follow a random walk. The results of filter rule studies, however,
suggest that short-run movements are partially predictable and can be exploited to generate excess
returns (e.g., Bilson 1981, Dootey and Shafer 1983, and Sweeney 1986). Based on studies of this type,
Meese (1986) hypothesizes that the profitability of filter rules rises as the sampling frequency of the
data increases. Alternative hypotheses leading to such predictable movements can be taken from recent
studies in U.S. stock returns. Following Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1987),
one hypothesis is that exchange rates exhibit mean reversion, implying predictable offsetting
movements.Another hypothesis is that exchange rate movements have inertia (i.e., positive
correlation), which corresponds to the results of Lo and MacKinlay (1987) for weekly stock returns.
Second, a number of studies do not reject the hypothesis that exchange rates sometimes reflect
speculative bubbles (e.g., Meese 1986, Evans 1986, and Woo 1987). In these instances, exchange rates
supposedly diverge from their fundamental values for significant periods of time before the bubble
bursts. The leptokurtic distributions of daily exchange rate changes (e.g., McFarland, Pettit, and Sung
1982, and Friedman and Vandersteel 1982) also are taken as evidence that large jumps occur too
frequently, perhaps reflecting sudden shifts back to fundamental values.Large jumps also can
potentially be characterized as resulting from over-reaction, a hypothesis analogous to that proposed by
Shiller (1981) for U.S. stock returns. -2
Third, short-run movements in asset prices and returns, including exchange rates, may simply
be characterized as noise (e.g., Black 1986, and DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman 1987).
Thatis, while noise trading could cause persistent speculative bubbles in exchange rates, such trading
also may result in short-run random movements away from fundamental values. These movements,
then, would not be expected to have any information content of their own. Announcement studies do,
however, indicate that at least some short-run movements in exchange rates can be linked to
unanticipated changes in economic fundamentals.Cornell (1982, 1983), Frankel and Hardouvelis
(1985), Engel and Frankel (1984), Hardouvelis (1984), and Roley (1987a), among others, find that U.S.
money announcements affect daily exchange rate movements. Hakkio and Pearce (1985) and Ito and
Roley (1987) consider additional economic announcements and find significant effects on more finely-
sampled intraday exchange rate movements.
The purpose of this paper is to examine intraday movements in the yen/dollar exchange rate in
terms of their predictability, behavior around large jumps, and information content." The yen/dollar
rate is particularly useful to examine these properties For at least two reasons. One is that New York
and Tokyo currency markets are open during nonoverlapping hours. So, with the daily opening and
closing quotes collected from each market, the behavior of the New York and Tokyo markets can be
compared. A second reason is that during the 1980-1986 sample period considered here, different policy
regimes emanating from both the U.S. and Japan were announced. Among these policy changes, Japan
made significant moves to liberalize capital market restrictions further. As a result, the daily behavior
of the yen/dollar rate over policy regimes may be different, and these potential differences can be
analyzed as well.
Following this introductory section, the second section summarizes the data used to investigate
the behavior of intraday yen/dollar rate movements. The various subsamples used, corresponding to
different policy regimes in both the U.S. and Japan, also are discussed. In the third section, the
predictability of intraday yen/dollar rate movements is tested. The null hypothesis in these tests is
that intraday movements Follow a random walk. An analysis of large jumps in the yen/dollar rate is
presented in the fourth section. Hypotheses relating to both bubbles and over-reaction are considered.3
Inthefifthsection, the information content of intraday movements is empirically examined. This is
accomplished by estimating the effects of changes in the yen/dollar rate on U.S. and Japanese stock
prices.Themain conclusions are summarized in the final section.
II.EXCHANGE RATE DATA AND POLICY REGIMES
To examine intraday movements in the yen/dollar exchange rate, four majorsegments are
considered within each business day from January 1, 1980, through September 29, 1986. (The timing
of the different segments is explained further in the Appendix.) First, exchange rate movements in the
Tokyo market are represented by opening (TKO) and closing (TKC) quotes. These quotes are
collected at 9:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. each day, the formal opening and closing times in this market.
Both the London and New York markets are closed during business hours in Tokyo. As such, this
segment is denoted as the "Tokyo" segment of the day. Second, from the close in the Tokyo market to
the opening in the New York market, European markets can influence the yen/dollar exchange rate
through cross arbitrage with European currencies. This segment is referred to as "Europe." Third,
yen/dollar rate quotes at 9:00 a.m. (NYO) to 4:30 p.m. (NYC) in New York are taken as the opening
and closing quotes in this market. This is the "New York" segment, although the London market is
still open concurrently at the very beginning hours of New York trading. The fourth segment of the
day differs from the others. In particular, there is no major market between New York and Tokyo.
For 2-1/2 hours (3-1/2 during daylight savings time), most of the Japanese, American, and European
market participants are not trading.For convenience, this period is referred to as the "Pacific"
market, and it is represented by movements from the closing New York quote (NYC) to the opening
Tokyo quote in the next day (TKO+i).
To take into account the effects of changes in policy and deregulation on intraday yen/dollar
exchange rate movements, several possible break points are considered within the 1980-86 sample.
First, in December 1980, sweeping deregulation occurred with respect to Japanese capital controls both
into and out of Japan." Second, in October 1982, the Federal Resrve announced the abandonment of
its previous monetary-controt procedure and also indicated that targets for the narrowty-defined money4
stock (Ml) would be dc-emphasized. Third, in February1984. the Federal Reserve adopted a different
reserve requirement system, and as a consequence the behavior of money and interest rates in the U.S.
may have changed.' Also in 1984, further efforts were made to liberalize Japanese capital markets
(Frankel 1984). Because of the closeness of these separate events in 1984, any relative effects cannot be
distinguished. Finally, in September 1985, the Group of Five (G5) meeting was held which may have
led to a concerted effort to depreciate the dollar (see Ito 1987). However, Feldstein (1986), among.
others, notes that the dollar had gradually been depreciating for seven months prior to the G5 meeting,
and that market forces may have been at least as important in causing the dollar's subsequent slide.
Any of the above policy changes may have not only affected onshore credit markets, but also the
stochastic behavior of exchange rates. Indeed, Roley (1987a) and Ito and Roley (1987) find significant
differences across regimes for the response of the yen/dollar rate to economic news. As a consequence,
the behavior of the yen/dollar rate will be considered for both the entire 1980-86 sample and the
subsamples implied by potential changes in policy regimes.
Summary statistics of yen/dollar exchange rate movements for each market and subsample are
presented in Table 1. Exchange rate movements are in percent, calculated as changes in natural
logarithms multiplied by 100. For the 1980-86 sample as a whole, the dollar tended to appreciate in
Tokyo and New York markets, and depreciate in the European and Pacific segments. The volatility of
the yen/dollar rate, measured by either the standard deviation or mean absolute change, was highest in
the New York market. The Tokyo market exhibited lower volatility than both the European and New
York segments. As expected, the volatility in the Pacific segment was the lowest, reflecting the relative
lack of trading and news during this part of the day.'
Summary statistics for the five subsainples suggest different behavior over time both within and
across markets. Outing the January 1980-November 1980 period, the Tokyo market exhibited the most
voltaility. In the remaining four subsamples, however, the New York market was the most volatile.
Moreover, with the exception of the September 1985-September 1986 period, the dollar on average
appreciated in New York. In contrast, the dollar depreciated in Tokyo in three of the five subsamples.
Some of the properties of intraday yen/dollar movements acorss subsamples and markets are5
tested in Table 2. The first row in the table, for example, tests whether the variances inthe first two
subsamples are significantly different in each market. The results indicate that the null hypothesisof
equal variancesacrossperiods can be rejected in the New York and Pacific markets. Similarly, the null
hypothesisof equal variances inthe secondandthird periods can be rejected in two ofthefour
markets.In the remaining tests across periods,thenull hypothesis can be rejected for all marketsat
low significance levels. The last test in the table examines whether the variances in theTokyo and
New York markets are significantly different. In all subsamptes except the first, the hypothesis ofequal
variances can be rejected. As a whole, these results support the notion that changes inpolicy regimes
altered the stochastic behavior or the yen/dollar rate. Moreover, the stochastic behaviorappears to
differ across markets. These data are examined in much more detail in the sections that follow.
III.PREDICTABILITY OF INTRADAY YEN/DOLLAR RATE MOVEMENTS
In this section, the predictability of intraday yen/dollar rate movements is examined.
Predictability is considered with respect to the three previous intraday movements, day-of-week effects,
and previous large jumps of one percentage point or more. The magnitude of the predicted changes
also is considered.
A plausible null hypothesis for intraday exchange rate movements is that they follow a random
walk. Consider, for example, the expected change in the exchange rate implied by uncovered interest
parity:
(3.1) 100 [Et(st+i) —t1=9(it-it),
where 5t=naturallogarithm of the yen/dollar rate in period t,
it,i =annualizedone-period interest rates, in percent, in Japan
and the U.S., respectively,
=expectationsoperator using all public information at time t,
C=parameterto adjust the differences in units between percent-
age changes in exchange rates and changes in annualized
interest rates.6
For nonzero values of the interest-rate differential, equation (3.1) implies that some portion of future
exchange rate movements is predictable. The predictability decreases, however, as the length of time
between t and t+1 shortens. In particular if the frequency of measured exchange rate movements is
one year, 9 takes a value of unity. If quarterly observations are used, B falls to 1/4. For daily data, 9
equals 1/365. Finally, with the four intraday segments considered here, B is approximately 1/4 of the
daily value, or 1/1460. As a consequence, for any plausible value of the Japanese -U.S.interest-rate
differential, the intraday predictive ability of the interest differential is approximately zero. Over the
1980-86 period, for example, 3-month dollar-denominated and yen-denominated interest rates were
most disparate in mid-1981, at about 12 percentage points. Assuming that the daily interest-rate
differential also peaked at about 12 percentage points, the implied daily dollar depreciation was 0.03
percent. At a level of 230 yen/dollar, which was the case then, the interest differential predicted dollar
depreciation of about 0.07 yen each day. With four intraday segments, the implied dollar depreciation
was only about 0.008 percent per segment, or 0.018 yen. The magnitude of this movement is well
below the bid-ask spread, which had a minimum value of 0.05 yen in the New York market over the
1980-86 sample.
Other representations of exchange rates also should imply random-walk behavior over very short
time periods, although not necessarily over longer periods (e.g., Hakkio 1986). In particular, even ii
uncovered interest parity does not hold because of a time-varying risk premium, movements in this risk
premium are likely to be unpredictable, or at least small, over an intraday period. Moreover, standard
models of spot exchange rates involving a vector of fundamentals plus expected exchange rate
movements (e.g., Frenkel and Mussa 1980) also can approximately lead to random walks over very
short horizons. In this case, because expected exchange rate movements can be assumed to be small,
movements in the spot rate primarily reflect innovations in the variables reflecting economic
fundamentals.
To test the random walk hypothesis, several alternative hypotheses are considered. The most
general specification estimated is7
(3.2) As.c+biAs1i+b2As.2+b3As.3+c1Tu+c2Wed+c3m
+ c4 Fri + d1 Asti+ d2 'i-2 + d3 issç3 + e,
where
As1 = change in the natural logarithm of the yen/dollar
rate,multipliedby 100, in intraday segment i,
Tu,Wed,Th,Fri = day-of-week dummies,
Ast = As if As 1.0 percent, zero otherwise,
= random error term,
= estimated coefficients (j=1,2,3,4).
A constant term is included in the specification to capture a variety of possible effects from either
systematic measurement errors in the variables across markets, small average predictable movements,
or small average predictable changes in the risk premium. The next three terms, -i' 'i-2' and
As.3,are included to testthe predktability of intraday yen/dollar rate movements based on the three
most recent intradaymovements.Themovementin Europeanmarkets,forexample,may have an
inertiaeffectonthewithin-the-marketchange inNewYork. Alternatively, the yen/dollarrate may
over-react to news in the Tokyomarket,and such movementsmaybe partiallyoffsetin the subsequent
European segment of the day. Positive values for the b3 imply inertia effects, while negative values
reflect mean reversion.
• The remaining variables in equation (3.2) allow fixed day-of-week effects and separate effects
from large jumps in the yen/dollar rate of 1 percent or more in previous segments. Several studies
have estimated significant day-of-week effects for exchange rates as well as other assets (e.g., Levi 1978,
French 1980, Gibbons and Hess 1981, and McFarland, Pettit, and Sung 1982). Equation (3.2) allows
effects different from Monday effects, which are embedded in the constant term. Previous large jumps
are included to allow any special inertia or mean reversion effects associated with such unusual events.
Large jumps are examined more closely in the next section.
As a preliminary test of the random walk hypothesis, the intraday yen/dollar rate data also are
tested for the presence of a single unit root (e.g., Meese and Singleton 1982). The specification used for8
this test is
(3.3) s =c+ bt + b1s1 i + b1 X_i + b2 'i2 + b3 Ssa +
where t is a time trend and the other variables are as defined previously. The null hypothesis
examined is H0 b=0, b'=l, and the marginal significance levels are taken from Dickey and Fuller
(1981), Table VLW
A. Estimation and Test Results
The estimation results for a restricted version of equation (3.2) along with various test results
are summarized in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 FortheTokyo, European, New York, and Pacific markets,
respectively. The results are reported for the entire sample and selected subsamples corresponding to
possible policy regimes." The middle of each of these tables gives the results for the unit root test.
The reported statistics indicate that the hypothesis that a single unit root is present can be rejected at
the 5 percent level in only two of 20 cases for the four markets across the five subsarnples. The
rejections occur in the last subsample in the European market and in the first subsample in the Pacific
market. This hypothesis also can be rejected for the overall sample in the Pacific market. As a whole,
however, the first-differenced specification (3.2) appears to be justified."
The top halves of each of the tables report estimation results for equation (3.2) with the
restriction c =
d3=0(j=1,2,3,4). That is, the effects of only the three previous intraday segments are
considered.1 For the Tokyo market, significantmean reversion relative to the Pacific segment is
estimated in three of five subsamples.In the first period, for example, the estimated coefficient
indicates that about 41 percent of the movement during the Pacific segment is offset in the Tokyo
market. Again, the Pacific segment is represented by the difference in the opening Tokyo quote in day
and the 4:30 p.m. quote in New York in day t-1. Because there are not formal opening and closing
times in the New York market, most of the observed movements during the Pacific segment most likely
reflect movements in New York after the 4:30 p.m. quote.' Consistent with this view, significant
mean reversion in the Tokyo market relative to the New York market also is estimated in two of the
five subsamples. In constrast, a significant inertia effect is estimated with respect to the previous9
Europeansegment in the fourth period. Tests of the significance of the three previous segments as a
group in predicting subsequent movements in the Tokyo market are reported in the second row of tests
in Table 3.These tests are performed using the heteroscedasticity-consisteut covariance matrix
proposedby White (198O)."Thetest results indicate that the three previous segments are significant
at the 5 percent level in three of the live periods and for the overall sample. Thus, the hypothesis that
the yen/dollar rate follows a random walk in the Tokyo market can generally be rejected.
Jn contrast to the results for the Tokyo market, the results for the European segment of the day
in Table 4 do not indicate mean-reverting behavior. Instead, significant inertia effects from the New
York market are estimated in three subsamples. Moreover, inertia with respect to the Tokyo market is
statistically significant in period I. The hypothesis that the effects of the three previous segments as a
group equal zero can be rejected in the first two periods as well as in the overall sample.
The results for the New York market in Table 5 are similar to those of the European market in
that the random walk model can be rejected in the first two periods and in the overall sample. They
differ, however, in that the results once again suggest statistically significant meau-reverting behavior,
this time with respect to the previous movement in the European market in periods I and II. During
period I, a large and significant inertia effect with respect to the Tokyo market also is estimated.
Finally, the results for the Pacific segment of the day suggest a mixture of mean reversion and
inertia with respect to movements during previous segments. For this segment, the random walk
hypothesis can be rejected in three periods and in the overall sample. In contrast to the other three
markets, the random walk model is rejected in the last subsample, which begins in September 1985.
As indicated in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, day-of-week dummies are statistically significant in only
two instances other than in the Pacific segrnent}" This also is the only segment that spans
weekends, which may account for the significance of day-of-week effects in two subsamples as well as
the overall sample in the Pacific market. The results in the tables additionally indicate that large
jumps in the yen/dollar rate only ha''e effects significantly different from the other movements of less
than 1 percent in three of the 20 possible cases for the five subsamples. Because of the relatively small
number of such large jumps however, it may not be possible to isolate their effects in this particular10
specification.
Several other issues relating to the results in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 also deserve mention. First,
the inclusion of both day-of-week dummies and possible separate effects of large jumps do not eliminate
the excess kurtosis found in previous studies (e.g., McFarland, Pettit, and Sung 1982, and Friedman
and Vandersteel 1982). This departure from the normal distribution, however, should not significantly
bias the reported test statistics (e.g., Miller 1986). Second, the presence of large jumps of 1percent or
more in both the current and lagged segments have little effect on the estimation and test results.
That is, outliers are not responsible for the significant departures from the random walk model
reported in the tables.UJ
Third, the rejection of the random walk hypothesis does not necessarily imply an unexploited
profit opportunity. In fact, most of the implied predicted changes are smaller than the typical bid-ask
spread of 0.10 yen, especially during later subsamples. The last rows of the tables give an indication of
the absolute sizes of the fitted values from the estimated equations. The fitted values used to calculate
the numbers reported in the tables are taken from the following:
(3.4) AS =Iai1I .
where =thefitted value for segment i of the version of equation (3.2)
reported in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, excluding the constant term,
sSi =Si-
Si=spotyen/dollar rate at the end of segment i.
The cutoff point in the tables is taken as 0.10 yen, the typical bid-ask spread. The results for the New
York market in Table 5, for example, show that 148 of the 208 observations in period I have absolute
predicted changes greater than 0.10 yen. By the fifth period, however, no fitted values are greater than
0.10 yen. This same pattern is generally repeated in the Tokyo and European markets, but not in the
Pacific segment, For the other three markets, however, the resultsmay be interpreted as support for
the assertion that as the market becomes large and more traders (speculators) participate in it, the
predictable portion of future price movements diminishes.U'11
IV.LARGE JUMPS IN THE EXCHANGE RATE
Thebehavior of the yen/dollar rate around large intraday jumps of at least 1 percent is
examined more closely in this section. Large jumps in asset prices often capture the attention of the
news media, and several common stories are encountered about movements following a jump. One is
that the price (exchange rate) declined, for example, because of "profit-taking" after a sharp rise.
Another is that the large jump itself represents over-reaction to relevant news, and the subsequent
decline merely moves the price back toward its equilibrium level. In any. event, there seems to be a
view, at least in the news media, that any large change in an asset's price is followed by a movement in
the opposite direction. There also is a view, which is not mutually exclusive, that sharp changes in the
price reflect the last stage of a bubble (or a bandwagon effect) in which the bubble bursts. A large
change by itself, however, is not evidence of a bubble. It may simply be reflecting some major news in
the world, such as the sudden death of a political leader, initiation of war in the Middle East, or a
major change in economic policy. Nevertheless, the profit-taking, over-reaction1 and bubble views
suggest that days around and including large price changes should be treated separately from other
days.
The top part of Table 7 lists the number of times in which the yen/dollar rate jumped by more
than 1 percent in each market. From Table 1, a change of 1 percent is more than two standard
deviations. By selecting the infrequent days with jumps of more than 1 percent, special characteristics
can be examined.
To examine large jumps initially, suppose that the exchange rate could deviate from an
otherwise stationary stochastic process for some period of time in the manner considered by Blanchard
and Watson(1982). Arational bubble could then emerge and burst occasionally. That is, this bubble
hypothesis for a large change within a day is that the jump is caused by the final stage of a bubble or a
bandwagon effect. A large jump can then be interpreted as a sudden correction to the natural
(equilibrium) level from an exploding bubble process. This interpretation predicts that the large jump
is preceded by a significant change in the opposite direction. Formally,12
(4.1) Jump=a + b(previous change) + e, b < 0.
Theprevious change is alternatively represented by either the change in the previous segment or the
cumulative change in the previous two segments, three segments, or week. Because this specification
only includes values of large jumps for the dependent variable, a sample selection bias exists that most
likely biases the results in favor of the bubble hypothesis.
The other specification considered involves the hypothesis that large jumps are partially offset in
the subsequent segment because of either profit-taking or mean-reversion following over-reaction.
Under this hypothesis, the subsequent movement is not necessarily large, but it is in the opposite
direction regardless of the reason for the jump. This behavior can be represented as
(1.2) (Change in subsequent segment) =a+ b(Jump) + e, b C0.
Differentmagnitudes of jumps over 1 percent also are considered separately in estimating this equation.
The empirical results for intraday segments with large jumps are summarized in the bottom
part of Table 7. The results for equation (4.1) indicate that there is very little evidence that large
jumps are preceded by cumulative changes in the opposite direction. While the estimated coefficients
are negative, they are not statistically significant at high marginal significance levels. Large jumps,
therefore, cannot be identified as the popping of a bubble. In contrast, there is some evidence that a
portion of a large jump is offset in the subsequent segment. The first row of results for this
specification indicates that a positive jump of 1 percent, for example, is partially offset by a 0.13
percent decline in the yen/dollar rate during the next segment of the day. For jumps greater than 1.25
and 1.5 percent, however, the next two rows in the table do not report statistically significant effects.
Thus, the segments following the 27 largest jumps in the sample do not exhibit significant mean-
reverting behavior.
V.INFORMATION CONTENT OF EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS
The information content of the intraday movements in the yen/dollar rate is examined in this
section. In this respect, the information content of short-run movements is interpreted as the degree to
which such movements reflect changes in fundamental factors. In turn, changes in fundamental factors13
mightbe expected to affect not only exchange rates, but other asset prices as well. Given the results in
previous sections. where intraday yen/dollar rate movements both sometimes failed to follow the
predicted random walk model and indicated offsetting movements following large jumps, the
information content of yen/dollar rate movements may be questioned.
To estimate the information content of yen/dollar rate movements, the responses of both U.S.
andJapanese stock prices are considered.Th' One advantage in using stock prices for thispurpose is
that equity markets are often characterized as being efficient in terms of processingnew information
quickly. So, if intraday movements in the yen/dollar rate reflect relevant information, stock prices
would be expected to respond within a day.
The effects of exchange rate movements in three of the four intraday segments on stock prices
are considered for both the U.S. and Japanese stock markets. All lour segments cannot be examined
for each stock market because of contemporaneous trading in the foreign exchange and stock markets.
Nevertheless, the formal opening and closing times of the New York Stock Exchange are ideal in
capturing the effects of three of the segments since New York stock trading begins at 9:30 a.m. and
ends at 4:00 p.m.'1 In contrast, the yen/dollar rate quotes in New York are collected at 9:00 a.m.
and 4:30 p.m. Thus, it is possible to construct movements in stock prices that capture the information
content of the exchange rate. In particular, exchange rate movements are measured from 4:30 p.m. on
the previous business day to 9:00 a.m. on the current business day. This time interval includes the
Pacific, Tokyo, and European exchange rate segments. Stock prices are measured from the previous
day's close at 4:00 p.m. to the current day's close. Exchange rate movements are therefore measured
when the New York stock market is closed. This new information should be reflected in stock prices
when the market opens at 9:30 a.m., and continue to be reflected at the 4:00 p.m. close. This
procedure nevertheless omits a relevant segment from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. in New York. However, a
variety of major U.S. economic announcements, including those for the consumer price index, producer
price index, industrial production, and the unemployment rate, are made at 9:00 a.m. or earlier.
Moreover, the information content of this segment is considered for the Tokyo stock market.
For the Tokyo stock market, the opening time is 9:00 a.m. and the market closes at 3:00 p.m.14
Analogous to the measured change in the New York stock market, daily changes from the 3:00 p.m.
close are used to examine the information content of three exchange rate segments. In this case,
however, the three segments represent the Pacific, New York, and European currency markets. As
before, currency trading in the three segments occurs when the Tokyo stock market is closed.
The specifications used to estimate the response of stock prices to intraday movements in the
yen/dollar rate can be represented as
(5.1) NYSPt -NYSPI=a +bj(NYOt.TKCt) + b2(TKCt.TKOt) + b3(TKOt.NYCt j)+
(5.2) TKSPt -TKSPL1=a +bj(TKOt-NYCt j)+b2(NYCt1NYOt1)
+ b3(NYOt i.TKCt i + et,
where NYSPL = natural logarithm of the Standard Sc Poors 500 Index at 4:00 p.m. (New York)
on day t, multiplied by 100,
TKSPt = natural logarithm of the Nikkei-Dow 225 Index at 3:00 p.m. (Tokyo) on day t,
multiplied by 100,
and the other variables, which were defined previously, also are in natural logarithms multiplied by
100. In addition to these basic specifications, the separate effects of large intraday jumps in the
yen/dollar rate are considered, as well as possible day-of-week effects iii the two stock markets, in a
manner analogous to equation (3.2)•W Finally, the random error terms, et. reflect movements in
stock prices from the closing quotes on day t-1 to the closing quotes on day t not due to the measured
changes in the exchange rate along with the response to new information from the opening of the stock
markets to the closing on day t. Under the efficient markets hypothesis, this latter component is
orthogonal to the measured changes in the yen/dollar rate in equations (5.1) and (5.2).
The estimation results for equation (5.1) are presented in Table 8. The results indicate that the
estimated response of U.S. stock prices is negative with respect to each segment in each subsample.th'
That is, dollar appreciation over these periods was associated with bad news for the U.S. stock market.
The hypothesis that the responses to movements in the three segments as a group equal zero (b1 = b2
= b3 = 0), however, can be rejected only for the complete sample and the second subsample. The15
resultsalsosuggestthatyen/dollar rate movements in the Tokyo market contain little or no
information. The estimated response of U.S. stock pricestothesemovementsis insignificantly different
from zero in every subsample. In contrast, for the entire sample, movements in both Europe (NYO -
TKC)and Pacific (TRO -NYC1)segments provide information. In the case of the Pacific segment1
the information may simply be the result of trading in New York after the 4:30 p.m. quote used here.
The test results in the table also suggest that infrequent large jumps in the yen/dollar rate in recent
years had extraordinary effects on U.S. stock prices in three of the subsamples, but not in the overall
sample.
Table 9 presents estimation and test results for the response of Japanese stock prices as
represented by equation (5.2). With only three exceptions, the response of Japanese stock prices to
intraday yen/dollar rate movements again is negative.Moreover, the response to the European
segment is significantly negative for every subsample, and the response to the New York segment is
significantly negative in two subsamples. Reflecting the estimated responses to the New York segment,
the hypothesis that the response to the three segments as a group equals zero can be rejected in periods
III, IV, and the overall sample. Also, the responses to jumps in the exchange rate are significantly
different from the other estimated responses only in the first period.
As a whole1 the results from both the U.S. and Japanese stock markets suggest that short-run
movements in the yen/dollar rate contain some relevant information. As a consequence, at least part
of these movements can be rationalized in terms of fundamental factors and not simply noise.
Moreover, during the 1980-86 sample period, changes in the implied underlying fundamental factors led
to a negative relationship between the yen/dollar rate and the stock market in each country. One
possible factor consistent with this result is world oil prices. An unanticipated rise in oil prices, for
example, adversely affects both economies, but such a rise has a larger negative effect on Japan since it
imports 99 percent of its oil. As a consequence, both stock markets could fall, and the dollar might
appreciate in value relative to the yen. The significant negative relationship between Tokyo stock
prices and yen/dollar rate movements in the European segment would appear to support this
hypothesis, as major world oil markets are trading during this part of the day. Another possible factor16
is U.S. money announcements.In the case ofa positive money announcement surprise, for example,
empiricalevidence suggeststhatU.S. realinterest ratesrise,thedollar appreciates in foreign exchange
markets,and U.S. stock prices fall.1 In response, the Japanese central bank may raise interestrates
tomoderate dollar appreciation, resulting in a similar decline in Japanese stock prices.
VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Intraday movements in the yen/dollar exchange rate were examined in this paper. The
availability of daily opening and closing quotes in both the New York and Tokyo markets allowed four
segments to be considered. These segments corresponded to currency trading in Tokyo, European, New
York, and Pacific markets.
Several aspects of the daily movements in the four markets were examined. First, the random
walk behavior of intraday movements was tested. Random walk behavior was rejected in about half of
the five subsamples considered during the 1980-86 period. The economic significance of the departures
from the random walk model declined, however, during the latter part of the sample. Second, the
behavior of the yen/dollar rate in segments immediately before and after large jumps was investigated.
The empirical results suggested that large jumps themselves could not be characterized as final stages
of speculative bubbles. The results did indicate, however, mean reversion in the segment following a
large jump. Finally, the information content of the intraday movements was considered in terms of
their effect on U.S. and Japanese stock prices. The results suggested that yen/dollar rate movements of
less than one day contain relevant information. As a consequence, intraday movements cannot simply
be characterized as noise.17
APPENDIX
Data Definitions and Sources
A.Exchange Rate Quotes
TICO =9a.m. quote in the Tokyo foreign exchange market
TKC =3:30p.m. quote in the Tokyo foreign exchange market
NYO =9a.m. quote in the New York foreign exchange market
NYC =4:30p.m.quotein the New York foreign exchange market
All quotes are in yen/dollar. Tokyo quotes were collected from a daily newspaper, Nihon Keizai




T9:00 A.M. (opening), IiiQ T-17:00 P.M. (closed) 8:00 P.M. (closed)
T3:30 P.M. (closing), D11 T1:30 A.M. (closed) 2:30 A.M. (closed)
T 10:00 P.M. (closed) T 8:00 A.M. (closed) 9:00.A.M.(opening), jXQ
T 11:00 P.M. (closed) T 9:00 A.M.(opening), JjQ 10:00 AM. (open)
T+1 5:30 A.M. (closed) T 3:30 P.M. (open) 4:30 P.M.(ctosing),flhj
T+1 6:30 A.M. (closed) T 4:30 P.M.(closing), liQ 5:30 P.M. (closed)
T+1 9:00 A.M. (opening), ThQ T 7:00 P.M. (closed) 8:00 P.M. (closed)
The New York foreign exchange market, unlike its Tokyo counterpart, does not havewelt-
defined business hours. Therefore, 9 A.M. and 4:30 P.M. quotes are only approximationsof the
opening and closing rates for the day.
The number of hours between opening (0) and closing (C) quotes is the following:
Tokyo (0) -Tokyo(C):6.5 hours (with 1.5 hour lunch break)
Tokyo (C) -N.Y.(0):7.5 hours (EST)/6.5 hours (EDT)
N.Y. (0) -N.Y.(C): 7.5 hours
N.Y. (C) -Tokyo(0):2.5 hours (EST)/3.5 hours (EDT)18
FOOTNOTES
1.Based on the profitability of filter rules on daily data, Meese (1986, pg. 346) states that "it
would appear that a major omission of empirical academic research has been to ignore analysis
of intraday exchangeratemovements... ."Thispaper attempts to fill part of this void.
2. See Ito (1986) for an analysis of the effect of the December 1980 changes on covered interest
parity.
3. The effects of these changes in Federal Reserve policy are considered in detail by Roley (1986,
1987b). The response of U.S. interest rates to money announcement surprises is found to change
significantly over the different regimes.
4. As reported in Ito and Roley (1987), correcting these data for differences in the number of hours
in each segment does not alter these qualitative results or the test results reported in Table 2.
In Ito and Roley (1987), however, changes in the yen/dollar rate are considered, as opposed to
the percentage changes used in Table 1. Corrections for the number of hours are riot made here
since the actual data used later correspond to those reported in Tables 1 and 2.
5. See Ito (1988) for tests which support uncovered interest parity for the case of the yen/dollar
rate.
6. The test results are qualitatively unchanged for the null hypothesis involving only b' =1.Also,
and s1 in equation (3.3) are multiplied by 100.
7. Observations involving national holidays in each country are deleted, but observations spanning
weekends are included.
8. While the other testsreported below use White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance
matrix in cases where the estimated standard errors increase using this procedure, the reported
results for the unit-root tests are not adjusted.In the other tests, the heteroscedasticity
correction does not significantly alter the test results, so it seems likely that corrections to the
unit-root tests also would not change the results appreciably. If heteroscedasticity was apparent,
however, procedures proposed by Phillips (1987) should probably be used.
9. A complete set of estimation and test results for various subcases of equation (3.2) is available
as a supplement from the authors. In general, the results are not sensitive to the exclusion or
inclusion of a particular set of variables.Specifications excluding the most recent lagged
segment also were estimated to consider the effects of possible spurious correlation due to
measurement errors, particularly in moving from quotes in the New York market to quotes in
the Tokyo market, and vice versa. Tests of the significance of lagged segments changed only
slightly in these specifications. In particular, the results in Tables 4 and 5 are the same, while in
Table 6 lagged segments are significant in period III at the 5 percent level but not in period I.
In Table 3, lagged segments in periods III and IV are no longer significant as a group at the 5
percent level, but they are significant at the 7 percent level.
10.This feature may be important for at least one day each week because of the effects of U.S.
money announcements, which were made either at 4:10 p.m., 4:15 p.m., or 4:30 pm. over
different subsamples.
11.White's (1980) correction is used for the same tests in Tables 4, 5, and 6 as well. Moreover, the
day-of-week dummies test uses this covariance matrix. However, the jumps test reported in
Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 does not. In general, the test statistics for the jumps test are higher using19
White's procedure, so the conservative approach of using the unadjusted covariance matrix was
followed.
12.The hypothesis that the effects of day-of-week dummies equal zero is tested in equation (3.2)
under the restriction that d1 =
dz=d1=0.Similarly, the effects of large jumps are tested in
equation (3.2) under the restriction that c1 =c2=
c3=
c4=0These tests also were
performed in equation (3.2) without any of these restrictions1 and the results were qualitatively
the same.
13,Both of these results again are reported in the supplement available from the authors.
14.It also should be emphasized that the reported numbers do not necessarily imply anything about
the profitability of filter rules. In particular, just fitted values are reported, not the accuracy of
the fitted values. The low 17(215 reported in the tables suggest that the' fitted values do not
capture much of the variation in actual values.
15.Obstfeld (1985) also uses stock prices to infer the factors affecting exchange rates.
16.During the earlier subsamples considered here, stock trading began at 10:00 a.m. in New York.
17.The estimation and test results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of day-of-week
dummies, so the reported results are for the specification without these dummies.
18.in the last subsample, however, the estimated response to the cumulative change in the three
segments was positive, but insignificantly different from zero, after the yen/dollar rate dropped
to about 160.
19.For evidence that U.S. money announcement surprises cause dollar appreciation, again see the
relevant references in the introduction. For evidence on the negative relationship between U.S.
money announcement surprises and U.S. stock prices, see Pearce and Roley (1985).20
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Summaryof Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate Movements in Four Markets
Entire Sample: January 1, 1980 —September29, 1986
Tokyo Europe New York Pacific
Mean .0014 —.0256 .0105
Standard Deviation .3448 .3579 .4265




Period I: January 1. 1980 —November30, 1980
Mean —.0057 —.0588 .0039
Standard Deviation .4404 .4044 .3988




Period II: December 1, 1980 —October4, 1982
Mean .0180 —.0239 .0570
Standard Deviation .4069 .3974 .4634




Period III: October 5, 1982 —January31, 1984
Mean —.0025 —.0412 .0060
Standard Deviation .2888 .3273 .4461




Period IV: February 1, 1984 —September22, 1985
Mean .0006 .0082 .0052
Standard Deviation .2089 .2868 .3339




Period V: September 23, 1985 —September29, 1986
Mean —.0166 —.0336 —.0537
Standard Deviation .3693 .3776 .4774




NOTES: Exchange rate movements are measured as changes in natural log-
arithms, multiplied by 100. If one market is closed because of
a holiday, then not only that market, but also adjacent markets
becooe missing observations. As a result, the number of obser-
vations can differ across markets for the same period.TABLE 2
Tests of Variances Across Periods and Markets
Tokyo Europe New York Pacific
H0: V(1)V(II) * * F—statistic 1.172 1.036 1.350 1.599
degrees of freedom (225,460) (216,446) (463,228) (444,217)
p—value .081 .377 .005 .000
Ho: V(II)=V(tII) * * F—statistic 1.985 1.474 1.079 1.129
degrees of freedom (460,328) (446,317) (463,331) (444,316)
p—value .000 .000 .230 .125
H0: V(1II)V(IV) * * * * F—statistic 1.912 1.303 1.785 1.212
degrees of freedom (328,411) (317,396) (331,408) (316,393)
p—value .000 .006 .000 .036
H0: V(IV)=V(V) * * * * F—statistic 3.127 1.733 2.044 4.335
degrees of freedom (252,411) (243,396) (255,408) (243,393)
p—value .000 .000 .000 .000
Period: I II III lY
U: V(TK)=V(NY) * * * * P—statistic 1.219 1.297 2.386 2.556 1.671
degrees of freedom (225,228) (463,460) (331,328) (408,411) (255,252)
p—value .068 .003 .000 .000 .000
NOTES: The alternative hypothesis is that one of the variances islarger, e.g.,
V(I) >V(II).V(j), j=I, II, III, IV, V, represents the variance in an
individualmarket in period j. V(TK)and VflW) are the variances in the
Tokyo and New York markets, respectively.
*
Significantat the 5 percent level.TABLE 3
Predictabilityof Exchange Rate Movements; Tokyo (TICC —11(0)
Coefficient Estimates and Summary Statistics
Period; I—V I It III IV V
Constant .003 .011 .029 .003—.004—.027
(.009) (.029) (.019) (.016)(.010) (.025)
* * * * Pacific —.192 —.409—.147—.310—.257—.142
(TKO—NYC1) (.043) (.202) (.105) (.092) (.067) (.081)
* * *
NewYork —.091—.215—.140—.058 —.057—.036
(NYC1—NY01) (.020)(.074) (.042) (.035) (.032) (.054)
* *
Europe .079 .077 .037 .053 .090 .133
(NY01—TKC1) (.024) (.072) (.049) (.049) (.036) (.069)
.03 .05 .03 .05 .05 .02
SE .34 .41 .40 .27 .20 .38
Test Results
Tests i—v i ii in iv v
Dickey—Fullerwith
time trend
1.440 1.265 3.436 1.195 1.758 0.855
observations 1547 206 429 303 382 233
p—value '.10 '.10 '.10 >.1O '.10 '.10
Previous 3 segments0 * * * *
F—statistic 9.861 2.348 4.121 3.240 2.982 1.650
degrees of freedom (3.1549) (3,202) (3,425) (3,299) (3,378)(3,229)
p-value .000 .074 .007 .022 .031 .179
Day—of—Week DuriesO *
F—statistic 1.716 1.562 0.539 2.536 1.314 1.270
degrees of freedom (4,1545) (4,198)(4,421) (4,295) (4.374) (4.225)
p—value .144 .186 .707 .040 .264 .283
Jumps0
F—statistic 0.735 1.128 1.188 3.262 1.916 0.889
degrees of freedom (3.1546)(1,201)(3,422) (1.298) (3.375)(3,226)
p—value .531 .190 .314 .072 .127 .448
Number of absolute fitted
values greater than .10 Yen
number 592 112 228 119 105 79
total observations 1553 206 429 303 382 233TABLE 3 ——continued
NOTES: Numbersin parentheses below the estimated coefficients are estimated
standarderrors. Jumps are absolute 1 percentage point or more changes
in a segment. The null hypothesis for the Dickey-Puller, day—of—week
dummies, and jumps tests corresponds to the specification with three
previous segments and a constant term in the top half of the table. The
test of the significance of the three previous segments also isper-
formed in this specification. Absolute fitted values are additionally
taken from this specification, but the estimated constant term is
excluded in the computations. Tests of the significance of the day—of—
weekdummies and the three previous segments use White's (1980) hetero—
scedasticity—consistent covariance matrix.
*
Significantat the 5 percent level.TABLE 4
Predictability of Exchange Rate Movements: Europe (NYU —TKC)
Coefficient Estimates and Summary Statistics
Period: I—V I lIT III iv v
* * *
Constant —.028—.060—.034—.041 .006—.038
(.009) (.028) (.019) (.018) (.015) (.026)
*
tokyo .056 .137 .031 .001 .083 .068
(TKC—TKO) (.032) (.066) (.047) (.064)(.073)(.067)
Pacific —.077—.037—.139—.156—.077—.025
(TED—NYC1) (.044) (.195)(.102) (.106)(.099)(.076)
* * * *
NewYork .121 .251 .150 .168 .075—.010
(NYC 1—NY01) (.025) (.074) (.041) (.041)(.046) (.052)
.02 .05 .03 .05 .01 —.01
SE .36 .40 .39 .32 .29 .38
Test Results
Tests 1V I II III IV V
Dickey—Fuller with
time trend *
2.448 0.646 1.313 3.314 0.447 6.342
observations 1562 208 432 306 378 235
p—value '.10 '.10 >.10 '.10 '.10 .05
Previous 3 segmentsO * * *
F—statistic 8.984 2.575 4.872 3.878 0.937 0.379
degrees of freedom (3,1555) (3,204)(3,428) (3,302) (3,374)(3,231)
p—value .000 .052 .002 .009 .422 .768
Day-of-WeekDummies0
F—statistic 2.324 1.7612.0110.8760.6821.383
degrees of freedom (4,1551)(4.200) (4,424) (4,298) (4,370) (4,227)
p—value .073 .153 .110 .453 .563 .246
Jumps0 *
F—statistic 1.980 0.247 0.333 3.520 0.853 1.172
degrees of freedom (3,1552) (2,202) (3,425) (2,300) (3,371) (3,228)
p—value .115 .864 .801 .015 .465 .319
Number of absolute fitted
values greater than .10 Yen
number 542 26 220 170 55 17
total observations 1559 208 432 306 378 235
NOTES: See the notes in Table 3.TABLE 5
Predictability of Exchange Rate Movements: New York (NYC —NYo)
Coefficient Estimates and Summary Statistics
Period: I—V I II III IV V
Constant .003 .000 .043 .002 .002—.049
(.011) (.026) (.022)(.025) (.018) (.030)
* * *
Europe —.077—.135—.149—.025—.043 .008
(NYO—TKC) (.030) (.063) (.055) (.077) (.060) (.078)
* *
Tokyo .121 .365 .031 .122 .153—.017
(TKC—TKO) (.031) (.060) (.054) (.081) (.085) (.079)
* * Pacific —.129—.192—.430—.195—.010 .004
(TK0—NYC1) (.053) (.179) (.119) (.146) (.112) (.090)
.02 .16 .04 .01 .00 —.01
SE .42 .37 .45 .44 .34 .45
Test Results
Tests I—V I II III IV V
Dickey—Fuller with
time trend
$3 2.493 0.422 2.256 0.837 2.912 2.814
observations 1559 208 432 306 378 235
p—value '.10 '.99 '.10 '.975 '.10 '.10
Previous 3 segments=0 * * * F—statistic 6.001 10.071 8.342 0.778 1.523 0.012
degrees of freedom (3,1555) (3,204)(3,428) (3,302) (3,374)(3,231)
p—value .001 .000 .000 .506 .207 .998
Day—of—Week Dummies=0 * F—statistic 2.502 2.6361.9110.0370.8661.584
degreesof freedom (4,1551) (4,200) (4,424) (4,298)(4.370) (4,227)
p—value .058 .035 .108 .997 .485 .179
.Jumps=0 * F—statistic 1.951 1.877 1.308 3.986 2.039 1.898
degrees of freedom (3,1552) (2,202) (3,425) (1,301) (3,371) (3,228)
p—value .119 .131 .270 .008 .107 .128
Number of absolute fitted
valuesgreater than .10 Yen
number 530 148 244 88 60 0
total observations 1559 208 432 306 378 235
NOTES: See the notes in Table 3.TABLE 6
Predictabilityof Exchange Rate Movements: Pacific (TKO —NYC1)
CoefficientEstimates and Suary Statistics
Period: I—V I II III IV V
* *
Constant —.013 .014—.006 —.007 —.013—.057
(.005)(.010) (.009) (.010) (.008) (.019)
* *
NewYork —.010—.091 .016 .008 —.105 .051
(NYC1—NYO1) (.012)(.027) (.019) (.022)(.024) (.042)
* *
Europe .012 —.034 .069 —.113 —.018 .088
(NY01—TKC1) (.014) (.025) (.022) (.030) (.028) (.053)
* * *
Tokyo .060 .051 .023 .001 .063 .223
(TKC1—TKO1) (.014) (.025) (.022) (.034) (.038) (.051)
.01 .04 .02 .04 .04 .09
SE .20 .14 .18 .17 .16 .29
Test Results
Tests 1—V I II III IV V
Dickey—Ful ler with
time trend * *
10.618 9.498 1.597 0.908 2.631 0.265
observations 1553 206 429 303 382 233
p—value <.01 <.01 >.lO '.975 '.10 >.99
Previous 3 segments0 * * * *
P—statistic 3.666 5.081 4.892 2.272 1.348 6.385
degrees of freedom (3.1549) (3,202)(3.425) (3.299) (3.378) (3,229)
p—value .012 .002 .002 .078 .257 .000
Day-of-Week Dummies=0 * * *
F—statistic 2.660 1.469 0.419 0.930 3.594 2.587
degrees of freedom (4,1545) (4,198) (4,421) (4,295) (4,374) (4.225)
p—value .047 .213 .795 .447 .007 .038
Jumps0 *
F—statistic 2.269 0.226 0.583 1.387 6.372 0.600
degrees of freedom (3,1346) (2,200) (3,422)(2,297) (3,375) (3.226)
p—value .079 .878 .626 .245 .000 .615
Number of absolute fitted
values greater than .10 Yen
number 54 39 56 68 75 102
total observations 1553 206 429 303 382 233
NOTES: See the notes in Table 3.TABLE 7
Behavior of the Exchange Rate Around Jumps
Number of Days with Absolute Changes
________of1 Percent or More
Tokyo Europe New York Pacific
Jan. 1, 1980 —Sept.29, 1986 36 22 57 8
Jan. 1, 1980 —Nov.30, 1980 10 5 7 0
Dec. 1, 1980 —Oct.4, 1982 13 8 15 2
Oct. 5, 1982 —Jan.31, 1984 4 2 13 1
Feb. 1, 1984 —Sept.22, 1985 2 3 6 1
Sept. 23, 1985 —Sept.29, 1986 7 4 16 4
Estimation Results
Jump =a+ b(previous change) +e
—2 Previous Change: a b R SE
*
previoussegment —.3570 —.2470 .00 1.28
(.1213) (.2049)
*
previous2 segments —.3780 —.1143 —.00 1.28
(.1230) (.1614)
previous 3 segments _359Ø* —.0002 —.01 1.28
(.1219) (.0015)
previous week _.3699* —.0430 —.00 1.29
(.1297) (.0509)
(change in subsequent segment) =a+b(junip)+ e
—2
Jump: N a b R SE
>1% 121 —.0437 _.1319* .09 .27
(.0487) (.0366)
• 1.25% 21 .4484 —.4493 .02 .40
(.5663) (.3789)
>1.5% 6 —2.1347 .9741 —.16 .52
(3.1158) (1.7200)
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses below coefficient estimates are standard errors.
N is the number of observations.
*
Significantat the 5 percent level.TABLE 8
Responseof U.S. Stock Prices to Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate Movements (NYSP— &YSP1)
CoefficientEstimates and Summary Statistics
Period: 1—V I II III IV V
Constant .022 .019—.037 .057 .028 .076
(.030)(.120)(.072) (.055)(.038)(.065)
-* *
Europe —.268—.119—.499 —.304 —.010—.144
(NY0—TKC) (.085)(.294)(.180) (.167) (.139)(.169)
Tokyo —.137—.205—.086 —.289 —.076—.086
(TKC—TKO) (.088)(.277) (.174) (.190) (.184)(.170)
* *
Pacific —.423—.065—1.15 —.099 —.399—.177
(TKO—NYC1)
(.151)(.839)(.385) (.317) (.246)(.195)
.01 —.01 .03 .01 —.00 —.00
SE 1.19 1.67 1.470.94 0.73 0.97
Tests of Information Content
Tests 1V I II III IV V
Previous 3 segments0 * *
F—statistic 5.233 0.543 3.761 1.232 1.046 0.714
degrees of freedom (3.1530) (3,199) (3,419)(3,298)(3.371) (3.227)
p—value .001 .653 .010 .297 .371 .544
Jumps0 * * *
F—statistic 0.145 1.089 0.329 3.546 11.53911.906
degrees of freedom (3,1527) (2,197) (3,416) (1,297) (2,369) (3.224)
p—value .933 .353 .804 .014 .000 .000
tCTES: The dependent variable in the regressions is the change in the natural log-
arithm of the Standard & Poors 500 Index, multiplied by 100, from the close
in day t—1 to the close in day t. Numbers in parentheses below the estimated
coefficients are estimated standard errors, The null hypothesis for the
jumps test correspon4s to the specification in the top part of the table.
The test of the significance of exchange rate movements in the three previous
segments also is performed in this specification using White's (1980) heter—
oscedasticity—consistent covariance matrix.
*
Significantat the 5 percent level.TABLE 9
Response of Japanese Stock Prices to Yen/Dollar Exchange RateNovemeits (TKSP —1KM
Coefficient Estimates and Summary Statistics
Period: I—V I II III IV V
* * * Constant .058 .039—.005 .110 .056 .145
(.024) (.034) (.069) (.033) (.037) (.050)
Pacific —.051—.191—.103 —.182 —.003 .077
(TK0—Nyc1) (.119) (.235) (.73) (.190)(.236) (.162)
New York —.170 .080—.106 —.432 —.348 .017
(NYC1—Nyo1) (.056) (.086) (.149) (.073) (.113) (.106)
Europe —.416—.311—.566 —.461 —.293—.303
(NY01—TICC1) (.067) (.084)(.179) (.102) (.127) (.135)
.03 .06 .02 .15 .03 .01
SE 0.92 0.48 1.41 0.56 0.71 0.74
Tests of Information Content
Tests i—v i II III IV V
Previous 3 segments=0
* * * * F—statistic 10.985 3.825 2.351 9.768 4.931 1.991 degrees of freedom (3,1535) (3,202) (3,419)(3,294) (3,378)(3,226) p—value .000 .010 .071 .000 .002 .113
Jumps0
* F—statistic 0.871 3.695 0.929 0.671 0.368 0.703 degrees of freedom (3,1532) (1.201) (3,416) (1,293) (3,375) (3,223) p—value .455 .011 .426 .570 .776 .550
NOTES: The dependent variable in theregressions is the change in the natural log-
arithm of the Nikkei—Doi., 225 Index, multipliedby 100, from the close in
day t—l to the close in day t.See the notes in Table 8.
*
Significantat the 5 percent level.